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Abstract 
The 'international community' is omnipresent in international debates. It is a 
point of reference. Much international action is undertaken in its name. And many a 
catastrophe – from Aleppo to climate change – is portrayed as a failure of the 
international community. As is clear from these random references, the functions, 
meanings and content of the concept of 'international community' are fluid: it is as 
appealing as it is evasive – and in fact, often it appeals precisely because it is 
evasive, and because a wide range of diverse, sometimes competing, meanings and 
expectations are projected onto it. The working paper seeks to unveil some of the 
functions, meanings and expectations projected upon the notion of 'international 
community'. While it focuses on debates in one particular field, viz. international 
law, its themes are of significance to a wider audience.  
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The ‘International Community’ as a 
Legal Notion 
 
 
Christian J. Tams1 
 
1 Introduction 
The 'international community' is a curious notion. Omnipresent and overused, it 
'haunts'2 international debates, almost like Karl Marx's spectre: it is an article of 
faith to many, a mere fiction to others; an aspiration, a realistic utopia,3 a tool of in- 
and exclusion, and perhaps even a 'descendant of the old European "standard of 
civilization"' (Jackson 2000: 359). International lawyers have found the notion 
irresistible and regularly use it as a yardstick against which international rules, and 
international conduct in pursuance of such rules, are assessed. Yet although it has 
become ubiquitous, the functions, meanings and content of the concept of 
'international community' often remain fluid: it is as appealing as it is evasive – and 
in fact, often it appeals precisely because it is evasive, and because a wide range of 
diverse, sometimes competing, meanings and expectations are projected onto it. 
Despite its evasive nature, the 'international community' concept has been woven 
into the fabric of international law. 
The subsequent comment seeks to unveil some of the functions, meanings and 
expectations projected upon the notion of 'international community'. This it does 
in three steps: by engaging with the notion of 'international community' (‘What’s in 
a name?’ – Section 2), by assessing the role of international law in 'international 
community' projects ('The function of international law in the 'international 
community' – Section 3), and by evaluating whether such 'international community' 
projects have influenced aspects of contemporary international law ('The proper 
law of the international community' – Section 4). Throughout these three steps, the 
protean character of the concept is emphasised. 
  
                                                          
 1 This paper expands on arguments made in the author’s contribution to Jean d’Aspremont and 
Sahib Singh, Concepts for International Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming). 
 2 Jouannet (2005: 3), 'une idée qui ne cesse de hanter le discours des juristes 
internationalistes'. 
 3 See e.g. Rawls (1999: 11); Cassese (2012). 
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2  The ‘International Community’: What’s in a Name? 
(a) Competing visions of international order 
That the term 'international community' should 'haunt' international lawyers (or 
indeed anyone) does not seem obvious. It sounds innocent enough, and often 
enough, it is used (innocently, as it were) as a generic reference to the 'countries of 
the world considered collectively'.4  What interests here is the not-so-innocent, not-
so-generic use; the one with assumptions. It, too, is common. Entire books have 
been written to 'prove' the existence of an 'international community'.5 Speaking in 
1999, shortly after the divisive Kosovo campaign (waged by a few in the name of 
the 'international community'6), and not so long after the Rwandan genocide 
(during which an outside intervention, including by a few self-proclaimed guardians 
of the 'international community', might have done wonders), Kofi Annan was 
defiant: 'The international community does exist. It has an address. It has 
achievements to its credit. And it is the only way forward' (Annan 1999). Others, 
perhaps, rather view it as a cul-de-sac. To Ruth Wedgwood, it is 'a dangerous 
reference point for the naïve' (Wedgwood 2002: 44). And Georg Schwarzenberger 
thought it 'require[d] a certain sense of humour … [t]o conceive international 
relations in terms of a community' (Schwarzenberger 1947: 160) – a sense of 
humour that Schwarzenberger himself did not seem to appreciate: hence he 
'ruthlessly … interrupted students who used the term "international community" 
instead of "international society"' (Steinle 2004: 672). 
(b) The essential normative claim 
These chance quotations perhaps reveal more about the authors’ anxieties than 
about the true state of international relations. But they point towards the essential 
normative claim embodied in the notion of 'international community' as it is used in 
most contemporary debates (and as it is understood here). An 'international 
community' is based not just on bargains and arrangements delimiting spheres of 
influence and competence between states. Instead, it builds on a threshold of 
shared values and assumptions, and is designed to give effect to common interests. 
Andreas Paulus makes the point perceptively: by speaking of an 'international 
community', he notes, one introduces 'a normative element' and assumes that 
there is 'a minimum of subjective cohesion to the social bond between its 
                                                          
 4 See the Oxford English Dictionary, online edition (at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/the_international_community). In that sense, the 'law of the international 
community' would be the law in force between the members of the 'international community' 
at any given point.  
 5 See e.g. Paulus (2001); Villalpando (2005); Payandeh (2010); and further Simma (1994); 
Tomuschat (1999); Buchan (2008: 3), and Besson (2009: 205). Andreas Paulus’ entry 
'International Community' in the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Paulus 
(2013) offers a very helpful summary of debates.   
 6 See e.g. Blair (1999), linking the bombing of Kosovo to the emergence 'of a new doctrine of 
international community'.  
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members'.7 In contemporary analyses, these qualifying elements distinguish a 
'community' from other forms of association, which are at times referred to as a 
'rabble'8 or a 'mere agglomeration'9, but most commonly (drawing on a rather 
creative application of Tönnies’ work10) as a 'society', i.e. a 'functional' association 
based on instrumental, rational, artificial links and 'contractual arrangements'.11 
Unlike rabbles, agglomerations or societies, a community is 'integrated' (Peters 2009: 
153), 'welded together' (Abi-Saab 1998: 2049), and united by some 'imperative of 
solidarity'.12 While terminology is anything but uniform,13 the rationale of the 
concept seems clear enough: an 'international community' designates a 'closer 
union' than a society (Tomuschat 1999: 210–11), and a more ambitious, more 
demanding, form of association. And while the brief references quoted so far 
emphasise the internal bonds between its members, a community is also 'defined 
                                                          
 7 Paulus (2013), para. 3; and further Abi-Saab (1998: 249),'In order to designate a group globally 
as a "community" it must first constitute a "society": that is to say, it must first attain a certain 
degree or threshold of intensity and stability (or normality) in relations among its members, 
enabling them to be identified and distinguished from other subjects found in the same 
sphere ... Only if this society is welded together by a sense of community, even to very 
different degrees, over a broad range of matters (that is to say of interests and values), can it 
be aggregately designated a "community"'. 
 8 Franck (1990: 196), according to whom a rabble 'typically involves unstructured, standardless 
interactions between actors whose conscious relationship to one another is limited to the 
circumstance of casual proximity'. 
 9 Peters (2009: 153), suggests that mere agglomerations are different because they lack 
'closeness' and 'common objectives'. 
 10 In his Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, first published in 1887, Ferdinand Tönnies distinguished 
between communities and societies. Communities in his view were characterised by 'organic' 
bonds, which members internalised and felt subjectively; by contrast, the links between 
members of a society were artificial and instrumental. This ties in with the idea of a 
community as a 'closer union', which in turn could explain the prominence of Tönnies in much 
of the legal literature (see e.g. Paulus (2001); Buchan (2008). However, as Besson (2009: 221), 
notes, Tönnies’ 'traditional distinction between society and community cannot apply as such 
to the international community'. Tönnies viewed the two forms of integration as alternatives, 
which may not be in line with today’s mainstream approach, according to which the 
'international community' is essentially a qualified society: one with social cohesion, as put by 
Paulus (2013), para. 3.  More importantly, in Tönnies’ understanding, the modern era was 
characterised by a move from community-type to society-type relations, not least because 
relations between members were increasingly shaped by law. All this suggests that 'a little 
less Tönnies' might benefit the debate. 
 11 Cf. the description by Buzan (1993: 333–6).  
 12 Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn (2009: 74). See also Hurrell (2007: 5): 'the core idea of 
solidarism can be seen in the constant appeals to the existence of an "international 
community" capable of fulfilling a broader range of political and moral purposes'. 
 13 The use of terminology employed by many scholars associated with the 'English school' of 
international relations deserves to be mentioned, as it is prone to cause confusion. According 
to Hedley Bull, for example, '[a] society of states (or international society) exists when a 
group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in 
the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions': Bull (1977: 162) 
et seq. In that reading, 'societies' are the closer union; 'communities' do not feature. Robert 
Jackson tries to link the two concepts; in his view, the 'universal societas of States … is a 
noticeably thin community': see Jackson (2000: 344).  
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by what it is not':14 like gated communities in desirable suburbs, the 'international 
community' can appear rather exclusive to outsiders and can seek 'to dissociate a 
miscreant … from membership'15.  
(c) False dichotomies 
The essential normative claim embodied in the notion of an 'international 
community' is clear enough, but it is also incredibly diffuse. "'[C]ommunity' is a 
relative concept' (Abi-Saab 1998: 249)16: if some level of normative cohesion is 
required, then the existence of an 'international community' is indeed 'a question 
of degree' (Abi-Saab 1998: 249). So much depends on where one draws the line. How 
much cohesion and integration is required (and between whom) before an 
association qualifies as a community? What is more, contrary to what the at times 
heated debate suggests, 'community' and 'society' are not mutually exclusive. As in 
most differentiated social systems, societal and communitarian forms of 
relationship co-exist at the international level17: the question is one of degree, not 
of principle.  
 
This affects arguments derived from the concept of 'international community'. 
Rather than permitting clear-cut distinctions, the concept is significant because it 
reflects a particular perspective on international relations: one that looks beyond 
states to include individuals, groups, companies; one that is willing to treat shared 
values as significant motivating factors; and one that adopts a dynamic perspective 
that contemplates (and values) a transition towards closer unions and the 
acceptance of limitations on state sovereignty.  
(d) The use of the concept in different traditions of thought  
Just like these perspectives, the use of the concept of 'international community' 
is historically contingent. In the modern period, it became common during the UN 
era, which brought about new levels of integration and prompted scholars to focus 
on the cooperative dimension of international relations.18 However, it was only in 
the 1990s that the concept rose to prominence. As globalisation and technical 
progress made interdependence a tangible reality, and the end of the Cold War 
prompted hopes of a new, value-based international order, the 'international 
                                                          
 14 Alkoby (2010: 57). 
 15 Chibundu (2004), text after note 149. See also Walzer (1995), ch. 2, recognising a community’s 
'right of closure'.  
 16 See also Alkoby (2010: 40): 'there is no precise moment when a social group becomes a 
"community"'. 
 17 As noted by Max Weber (1972: 21): 'die große Mehrzahl sozialer Beziehungen … hat teils den 
Charakter der Vergemeinschaftung, teils den der Vergesellschaftung'. 
 18 See Abi-Saab (1998:  249) 'It is the advent of this institutional element which definitively 
reveals the existence of a sense of community'. For legal perspectives on international law as 
a 'law of cooperation' see Friedmann (1964).  
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community' to many seemed an apt term to describe a new, more ambitious stage 
in international relations.19  
 
These hopes of course were not universally shared. Critical scholars from 
different backgrounds queried whether the values of the 'international community' 
were truly common to its members, or merely imposed – and whether 
proclamations of an 'international community' did not mainly serve to marginalise 
dissent.20 From their perspective, the concept appears to be yet another 
instrument for legitimising existing structures of dominance: "[t]he idea of 
'international community' itself is implicated in this relationship of continued 
domination" (Alkoby 2010: 57). But in the discourse of the 1990s, these were 
relatively marginal voices: an 'international community project' reflected the 
optimistic spirit of the post-Cold War era. 
 
While rising to prominence, the concept of 'international community' also 
became more nuanced. In the mainstream discourse of the 1990s, different strands 
emerged, which to this date remain significant. Drawing on Andreas Paulus’ 
detailed analysis, these different strands can be broadly grouped into two main 
camps – two traditions of thought that built on the 'international community' 
concept to spell out their vision of the international order:21 
 
Institutionalist theories of international order are the first such tradition. They 
emphasise the role of international organisations, and of the UN in particular. 
Representing the overwhelming majority of states, the UN has a credible claim to 
be 'carr[ying] the mantle for the international community' (Rocard 2013: 3). In many 
blueprints, the path towards a value-based community runs via progressive 
institutionalisation.22 Global institutions thus appear as natural fora in which 
decisions on questions of community concern are taken: '[i]nternational 
organization is … in a very rudimentary sense, an expression of the concept that 
there is an international community which bears responsibility for dealing with 
matters that refuse to be confined within national boundaries' (Claude 1971: 447). 
In that approach, depending on the focus of the argument, the establishment of 
relevant international organisations during the 20th century symbolises the move 
from international society towards 'international community',23 just as much as it 
can serve as an argument supporting further steps towards institutionalisation.  
                                                          
 19 Paulus (2001) offers a detailed historical account.   
 20 See the references in Paulus (2001: 2010) et seq.; and further Chibundu (2004); Appardurai 
(2002: 42).  
 21 The following draws on Andreas Paulus’ detailed work: see Paulus (2001).  
 22 In fact, in the more radical versions, the UN (or even one of its organs) is equated with the 
'international community': see Chomsky (2002: 34): 'The literal sense [of the term 
"international community"] is reasonably clear; the U.N. General Assembly, or a substantial 
majority of it, is a fair first approximation'.    
 23 See e.g. Abi-Saab (1998: 256): '[E]ach level of normative density requires a corresponding level 
of institutional density in order to enable the norms to be applied in a satisfactory manner. In 
other words, norms resulting from the law of cooperation approach, however ambitious they 
may be, cannot have a real social hold without adequate institutional arrangements for 
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Liberal-cosmopolitan approaches to world order place equal emphasis on the 
concept of 'international community'. They do not necessarily dispute the 
significance of institutionalism.24 However, they approach the concept from a 
different vantage point, viz. from the idea of core liberal values and/or universal 
human rights. 'A liberal concept of international community', notes Paulus, 
'focus[es] on individual rights and duties'. Liberal concepts themselves are rather 
heterogeneous. Radical calls for a wholesale re-modelling of the international 
order into a system organised around individuals25 exist alongside proposals that 
view states as trustees tasked to 'discharge a mandate for the benefits of human 
beings under their jurisdiction' (Tomuschat 1999: 300). 
 
Liberal-cosmopolitan and institutionalist approaches in many ways overlap; at 
times they are merged into constitutionalist blueprints, which combine 
cosmopolitan guarantees and a (typically Charter-based) framework.26 They share 
an anti-étatist impulse: the state is perceived (also) as a threat to individual rights, 
and state sovereignty as an obstacle to the effective realisation of community 
concerns. Liberal and institutional approaches therefore both question the 
dominant role of states in the international order, or condition it upon the 
acceptance of basic community concerns (notably human rights). But they 
emphasise different aspects and point in different directions: where the 
institutionalist variant relies on international organisations, the liberal variant 
emphasises the entrenchment of substantive standards: '[t]he institutional 
expression of liberal values is less important than the protection of individual 
rights'.27 As will be shown in the following, the two approaches can conflict – and 
these conflicts in turn allow us to test how the notion of an 'international 
community' could be operationalised. 
  
                                                                                                                                                               
applying them. It is the advent of this institutional element which definitively reveals the 
existence of a sense of community at the basis of the regulation' (references omitted).  
 24 In fact, institutionalist and liberal readings often go hand in hand: see e.g. Cassese (2002: 45): 
'[A]t least at the normative level the international community is becoming more integrated 
and—what is even more important ... such values as human rights and the need to promote 
development are increasingly permeating various sectors of international law that previously 
seemed impervious to them'.  
 25 See e.g. (with many variations between them) Tesón (1992: 53); Buchanan (2003), or more 
recently Peters (2009). 
 26 For prominent examples see Peters (2009); Fassbender (1998: 529).  
 27 Paulus (2013), para. 24. 
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3 The Function of International Law in the 
‘International Community’ 
(a) Generalities 
The discussion so far has largely left aside the role of international law within 
'international community designs', or at least not tackled them directly. The 
remainder of this short essay addresses them, doing so in two steps: the present 
section explores the function of international law in the 'international community' 
in a general manner; Section 4 then assesses to what extent international law has 
become a proper law of the 'international community'. 
 
The 'function of [international] law in the international community'28 has 
occupied international lawyers for decades; perhaps this is the discipline's holy 
grail. The following considerations focus on one aspect of the broader quest: they 
map out the role assigned to international law in the community designs 
summarised so far.  While addressing the question from a different vantage point, 
the discussion continues the theme of Section 2: it seeks to show that, just as the 
'international community' is difficult to pin down, so is the role of international law 
within it. International law is ambivalent, and it is malleable. More specifically, the 
subsequent considerations make three relatively straightforward points, which are 
unlikely to be controversial, but are surprisingly often not made:  
• International law is an integral element of the 'international community'; 
it features prominently in most community schemes.  
• While relied upon by proponents of an 'international community', 
international law also offers solace to those who resist integration in a 
community: it is ambivalent, and often ambiguous. 
• Precisely for that reason, international law is an important site of 
contestation in the struggle to operationalise projects and plans of an 
'international community'.  
(b) International law as the 'glue' of the 'international community' 
To begin, international law is an integral part of debates about the ‘international 
community’. As Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn (2011: 141) note, many of the 
demands of the 'international community' projects 'correlate with international 
law' (Bliesmann de Guevara and Kühn 2011: 141). International law, to be sure, in 
and of itself is not sufficient to make for a community; it needs to be filled with life, 
accepted, and considered legitimate. But it offers the natural language in which 
many debates are conducted, and it can be seen as the 'glue' (Peters 2003: 154) 
that is meant to hold together a community. Put differently, in the terms used 
above, international law can reflect the required 'minimum of social cohesion' 
                                                          
 28 See Lauterpacht (1933); Allott (1998: 391). 
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characteristic of a community, and enshrine the 'shared values' on which it is based. 
In that perspective, international law embodies decisions reached by the members 
of the community, and conversely helps stabilise them.  
In line with this instrumental understanding, the main schools of thought 
referred to above heavily rely on international law as a 'transmission belt' for 
community interests. Institutionalists emphasise the significance of constitutional 
arrangements like the UN Charter, which provide the framework for the 
'international community’s' action.29 By the same token, the gradual recognition, in 
multilateral treaties and customary law, of an international bill of rights offers a 
normative grounding for liberal notions of the 'international community'.30 In both 
approaches, international law facilitates 'integration' within the 'international 
community' and helps 'weld [that community] together' (Abi-Saab 1998: 249). 
Samantha Besson seems to go even further when suggesting that the 
"'international community' only appeared as it is today through the operation and 
development of international law" (Besson 2009:  222).   
All this suggests that the path towards an 'international community' is paved with 
normative intentions. Supporters of the concept see in international law a powerful 
centripetal force. It is worth adding that critics of the community concept do not 
necessarily disagree: many of them accept that a true community would have to be 
enshrined in international law; however, in their assessment, international law as it 
stands does not reflect a sufficient level of cohesion, nor is it sufficiently accepted 
to matter.31 Both approaches view international law as a unifying force that can 
help shape an international community – though they disagree whether in reality 
international law is sufficiently developed to produce such effects.  
(c) International law’s ambivalence 
The latter comments point towards a necessary reality check. Of course, 
international law does not only facilitate the integration of the 'international 
community'. It is not uni-directional, let alone monolithic – but ambivalent: some 
strands of international law are conducive to integration, other strands hinder it. As 
in many other debates, the main line is not between law and non-law, but between 
the different directions in which legal arguments point. Rather than endorsing one 
particular (integrated, communitarian) vision of the international order, 
international law reflects the tensions between community and society, inter- and 
independence, coexistence and cooperation,32 and as in most other social systems, 
                                                          
 29 See e.g. Fassbender (1998).  
 30 Andreas Paulus refers to the 'unstoppable march of globalization towards the construction of 
global institutions': Paulus (2013), para. 20.   
 31 Ruth Wedgwood singles out one particular aspect of this when dismissing the 'international 
community[’ s] …  words [that] have no supporting cannon fire': Wedgwood (2002: 46).  
 32 Martti Koskenniemi argues that this ambivalence characterises '[t]he sense of the legal 
project' tout court, and that 'the law lacks a principle for choosing either one and therefore 
contains both within itself': in his view, 'the international legal project … describes social life 
among States alternatively in terms of community and autonomy. These descriptions support 
conflicting demands for freedom and order. In the one case, community is interpreted as 
negative collectivism and autonomy (independence, self-determination) is presented as the 
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societal and communitarian relationships co-exist (Weber 1972). For example, 
international law comprises human rights treaties – but also a resilient principle of 
sovereign immunity. International law establishes powerful organs of international 
organisations – but at the same time cherishes consensualism and non-
intervention. In grand rhetoric, international law requires disputes to be resolved 
peacefully – but is content with a minimalist implementation of that requirement, 
which views negotiation as the default form of settlement. What is more, many 
rules of international law are ambiguous. Depending on one’s perspective, the ban 
on force can be seen as a milestone on the way towards a community based on law 
rather than power – or as a roadblock hindering effective action in defence of 
community interests. The examples could be multiplied, but the essential point will 
have become clear. International law is an integral part of community schemes. 
However, enshrining centrifugal forces alongside centripetal ones, it is also a 
powerful obstacle to the realisation of these schemes.33 
(d) International law as a site of contestation 
International law is not only multi-directional. It is also in a process of constant 
adjustment. Designed to regularise conduct and stabilise normative expectations, 
it hardly ever changes suddenly. Yet it evolves over time. Evolution can take the 
form of concerted law-making (e.g. in processes of codification and progressive 
development) or, more subtly, of the gradual adaptation of the law to changing 
realities (e.g. through processes of dynamic treaty interpretation or the trickling 
down of practice into modified custom). In these processes, centripetal and 
centrifugal forces clash; the resulting law is a product of their interaction. For 
present purposes, what matters is that law-making and adjustment processes offer 
opportunities to translate visions of an 'international community' into positive 
international law, viz. to shape a proper law of the 'international community'. As 
will be shown below, this has regularly been attempted, with varying degrees of 
success. Precisely because it is integral to many visions of an 'international 
community', international law is an important site of contestation. Conversely, an 
analysis of its evolution can offer insights into the strength of the community 
concept at various points in time: as the lines between society and community are 
fluid, and as international law is multi-directional, such an analysis is likely to yield 
mixed results. But it can point to distinctions between areas of greater and lesser 
normative integration, and help understand which variants of 'international 
community' projects have left a heavier footprint than others. In this sense, 
international law is an important litmus test for 'international community' projects. 
While a full analysis is well beyond the scope of this short essay, Section 4 offers 
three small sample tests.34 
                                                                                                                                                               
normative goal. In the other, autonomy is interpreted as negative egoism and community 
(integration, solidarity) as what the law should aim at. Neither community nor autonomy can 
be exclusive goals': see Koskenniemi (2005: 476).  
 33 Juliane Kokott tries to bring the two aspects together when noting that: 'sovereign equality 
[on which she focuses, and which would qualify as a 'powerful centrifugal force'] shields 
public international law against unrealistic demands': Kokott (2013), para. 82.  
 34 For more detailed analyses see notably Payandeh (2010) and Paulus (2001).   
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4 The Proper Law of the 'International Community': 
Selected Sites of Contestation 
(a) Three sample tests  
To what extent, then, does international law reflect the needs of an 'international 
community'? To what extent has it opened up to embrace individuals and other 
non-state actors, and which of its branches have taken up 'community impulses' 
towards greater cohesion and integration? The subsequent considerations engage 
with these questions selectively. They address the regime of law-making, the UN 
Charter’s collective security system, and the law of state responsibility – and 
question to what extent these reflect (or have come to reflect) the 'international 
community' project’s demands. The samples are too selective to support any claim 
of representativeness, yet they concern different layers of the contemporary legal 
regime: the first (law-making) is foundational, the second (collective security) 
addresses a major question of international institutional law, the third (state 
responsibility) looks at a longstanding attempt to clarify a 'cardinal institution'35 of 
general international law. The following sub-sections offer three pen portraits of 
these 'sample areas': cursory assessments of the developments of international law 
over the course of the past decades, i.e. at a time when the concept of 
'international community' in its contemporary form had begun to gain contours and 
could be expected to influence the evolution of international law.  
(b) The 'international community' in the international law-making process 
The first pen portrait depicts the process by which international law is made (or 
adjusted). To what extent is this a community-driven process? Can international law 
be expressed in forms that suitably reflect an 'international community'?  
The traditional regime of law-making offered relatively little to accommodate 
community concerns. In fact, traditional law-making was premised on two major 
obstacles: First, linking law-making capacity to legal personality, and reserving legal 
personality for states, it viewed international law as law agreed between states.36 
And second, by consolidating a sources doctrine based on treaties and custom, it 
emphasised the role of state consent, or state conduct, in the law-making 
process.37 
Unsurprisingly, adherents of community projects have taken issue with both 
premises. Liberal-cosmopolitan approaches question the centrality of states; in line 
with their more inclusive understanding, law-making in an 'international 
                                                          
 35 Crawford (2006), para. 1. 
 36 See d’Aspremont (2015: 121–2), 'a correlation ...between states as the subjects of 
international law and subjecthood [i.e. legal personality] ... Law-making was seen as a matter 
for subjects of international law'.  
 37 See Danilenko (1993: 193) 'The existing [i.e. traditional] system of sources of international law 
reflects a vision of an international order which is based on the co-existence of independent 
and sovereign states.' 
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community' could not be reserved for states. Anne Peters makes the point very 
clearly: 'The concept of an international community suggests inclusiveness, and 
therefore tends to favour rather than to hinder the inclusion of non-state actors' 
(Peters 2009: 153). In the same vein, there have been many attempts to free the law-
making process from its voluntarist shackles and transform the inter-state law into 
a properly transnational law of the 'international community'.38  
The impact of these initiatives on the regime of law-making has been relatively 
modest. Six decades after Philip C. Jessup called for a more inclusive treatment of 
'all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers'39 (which 
he termed Transnational Law), it seems fair to say that attempts to include non-
state actors in the law-making process have yielded limited results. The doctrine of 
legal personality may have been opened up to include non-state actors of different 
types. However, in opening up, it has been de-coupled from law-making powers: 
'while international law is no longer created only for states, it remains largely—at 
least in formal law-making channels—created by states,' observes Samantha 
Besson (2009: 211). Of course, on the margins, non-state actors are being admitted 
into the law-making process. The formal treaty-making capacity of international 
organisations has been recognised,40 and there have been attempts to bring 
agreements concluded with groups or companies into the realm of international 
law.41 The conduct of international organisations (including that of their 
autonomous organs) can affect the interpretation of treaties and identification of 
custom.42 And via the medium of state agencies, non-state actors are pushing law-
making agendas, at times effectively.43 But their involvement in the process is 
mostly indirect, and where it is not, it remains exceptional and concerns discrete 
issues. For all practical purposes, states have retained control over the 
international law-making process.44 
The second obstacle, voluntarism, has come under more strain, but it too has 
proved relatively resilient.45 The close nexus between international law and state 
                                                          
 38 For diverse proposals pointing in that direction, see e.g. Domingo (2010); Ziccardi and Capaldo 
(2008); Wessel (2011: 253).  
 39 See (Jessup 1956: 2). 
 40 See the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations, 25 ILM 543 (1986); and further Webb 
(2014: 567). 
 41 Notably through attempts to 'internationalise' State contracts, see Karavias (2014: 597). It is 
worth adding that these attempts have had modest success at best. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Co. case, which was based on the theory of internationalisation, the ICJ 'would have none of it 
[…] It simply said, these contracts are governed by municipal law and they are not 
internationalized at all': (Crawford 2011: 19); and see ICJ Reports (1952: 93).  
 42 See e.g. Kadelbach (2012), para. 36.   
 43 See Noortmann and Ryngaert (2010); Bothe (2012: 1399).  
 44 d’Aspremont (2015: 121), et seq.; Paulus (2001: 248–9).  
 45 For calls for reform see e.g. the works cited in fn. 37, as well as Charney/Danilenko (1995: 25), 
'faced with a number of global problems affecting the interests of every human being on this 
planet, the international community may find that a constitutional theory based on state 
consent presents unacceptable obstacles to necessary solutions.' Merdad Payandeh offers a 
detailed analysis of trends towards more community-oriented forms of law-making: see 
Payandeh (2010), ch. 6.  
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conduct is at times stretched, but has not been severed. Treaties and custom, both 
based on the conduct of states, remain central; by contrast, proposals to treat 
expressions of community interest – such as General Assembly resolutions or 
summit declarations – as sources of law in their own right have been given short 
shrift.46 What developments there have been concern the application of the 
traditional sources, and that of custom in particular. The two component elements 
of custom – general practice and opinio juris – have been deformalised and to some 
extent disconnected from individual state conduct.47 Much of contemporary 
custom is a by-product of UN-sponsored processes of normative clarification: 
General Assembly Resolutions, ILC Reports and ICJ judgments are regularly treated 
as a privileged 'source', from which rules of custom are derived48. As shortcuts to 
the 'general practice, accepted as law' required by Article 38(1)(b), they bring 
custom under the influence of the institutionalised 'international community' .49   
 
Two other developments reflect a more direct impact of 'community arguments' 
on the process of customary law-making. The first concerns the identification of 
customary rules protecting shared community values. According to a popular claim, 
there is, for example, room to 'find' customary human rights, or customary rules of 
war, on the basis of a strong and globally expressed opinio juris, including that of 
expert bodies and human rights courts.50 In some instances, such claims are 
expressly justified by reference to individual rights’ centrality to the 'international 
community' project. However, the more obviously 'creative' applications of this 
approach have met with opposition, and the recent work of the International Law 
Commissions views the idea of special regimes of custom identification in 
'desirable' fields of law with much caution.51 
The second development is less controversial, but perhaps illustrates the 
strength of 'community arguments' more clearly. It concerns the impact of state 
succession on custom. After significant debate, it seems generally accepted today 
that succession leaves customary rights and obligations unaffected: successor 
states, including new states that never had an opportunity to contribute to the 
process of law-making, do not join the 'international community'  with a clean slate, 
but are, from their emergence, bound by rules of customary international law.52 
They are bound because membership of the international legal community comes 
                                                          
 46 For proposals see Cheng (1965: 23); Ago (1956: 932), et seq.  
 47 For a clear account see d’Aspremont (2011), ch. 5, assessing the '[d]eformalization of law-
ascertainment in the contemporary theory of the sources of international law'.  
 48 See Tams (2015: 59), et seq.  
 49 Danilenko (1993: 193) speaks of a 'movement towards community-based law-making'. 
 50 See the debate and references in d’Aspremont (2013: 73); Frulli (2015: 80) 
 51 At an early stage of the project, the ILC’s Special Rapporteur set out his view that 'given the 
unity of international law and the fact that international law is a legal system, it is neither 
helpful nor in accordance with principle, for the purposes of the present topic, to break the 
law up into separate specialist fields. The same basic approach to the formation and 
identification of customary international law applies regardless of the field of law under 
consideration': Wood (2012), para. 22.  
 52 Thirlway (2014: 97–8). In the words of one of the most prominent commentators, 'a new 
state is born into a world of law'; see O’Connell (1965: 12).  
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with rights and duties – and because stability and predictability require it.53 While 
taken for granted in most contemporary debates, the doctrine of universal 
automatic succession is perhaps the clearest illustration of how customary law-
making is adapted to accommodate the demands of the 'international community'.  
In the field of treaty law, voluntarism has been more difficult to water down. 
Multilateral treaties may be, in Bruno Simma’s oft-quoted phrase, 'workhorses of 
community interest' (Simma 1993: 322). Yet they are agreed in structured processes 
that emphasise the role of (written, formal) state consent.54 Article 34 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties spells out the cardinal principle when 
clarifying that '[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
state without its consent'.55 As a consequence, non-participation remains an option: 
the treaty law of the 'international community' is based on voluntary association.  
Debates about state succession illustrate the significant power of voluntarist 
arguments within the law of treaties. Unlike with respect to customary 
international law, arguments in favour of automatic succession to treaties have 
met with significant resistance. Claims that new states should be bound by all 
treaties entered into by their predecessor56 have largely been given up in favour of 
a narrower doctrine of qualified succession to major world order treaties 
protecting core interests of the 'international community', such as the Genocide 
Convention or the Geneva Conventions.57 These narrower claims reflect the desire 
to ensure the legal protection of core community interests during times of rupture 
– but it is telling that even the narrower argument is by no means accepted58 
What has been accepted, by contrast, is a limitation on what states can agree to 
in treaties. The doctrine of peremptory norms (ius cogens), the focal point of many 
debates about the 'anchoring' of community concepts in black letter international 
law,59 demarcates a 'no-go area': treaties that conflict with peremptory norms are 
void;60 in this respect, community interests quite clearly trump state consent. Since 
its recognition in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ius cogens has been 
                                                          
 53 For contemporary perspectives on the debate see Zemanek (1965: 179); Falk (1966: 26), et 
seq.; Bedjaoui (1970: 455) and O’Connell (1970: 95).  
 54 See e.g. Article 2(1) (g) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which defines 
the term (treaty) party as 'a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for 
which the treaty is in force'. Articles 11-17 VCLT spell out the various ways of expressing 
consent to being bound.  
 55 According to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (1960: 83), the pacta tertiis rule is 'so fundamental, self-
evident and well-known, that [it] do[es] not really require the citation of much authority in … 
support'.  
 56 See notably Article 34(1) of the 1978 Vienna Convention, which adopts automatic succession 
as the default rule, with an exception for newly independent States, as defined in Article 
16.The common view today is that Article 34, which is the key factor explaining the 1978 
Convention’s poor ratification record, does not reflect custom: Brownlie (2008: 661–2); Aust 
(2005: 370–1); Cassese (2002: 78).  
 57 See e.g. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 26 (61): Continuity of Obligations, 
reproduced in ILM 34 (1995: 839); Kamminga (1996: 469); and cf. Rasulov (2003: 141). 
 58 For cautious comment see e.g. Zimmermann/Devaney (2014: 533–6); and (less cautiously) 
Payandeh (2010: 23) et seq. 
 59 See e.g. Paulus (2001: 329),et seq.; Payandeh (2010: 335) et seq.  
 60 See Article 53 VCLT. 
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accepted as an important vehicle in translating community interests into positive 
international law, but it is one which (as has famously been observed) 'hardly ever 
leaves the garage' (Brownlie 1988: 110), simply because states hardly ever violate 
peremptory norms by treaty. (They do so differently; and the real challenge has 
been to devise a regime of 'Jus Cogens beyond the Vienna Convention'61).  
The first pen portrait suggests that law-making in the 'international community' 
remains largely 'societal', with some communitarian sprinkling added for good 
measure. The legislative function remains a state prerogative, one that is guarded 
jealously. State consent and conduct remain central, whether it is via custom or 
treaty, but the voluntarist system is being gradually reformed from within. The 
reforms sketched out in the preceding section respond to claims advanced in 
'international community' projects: they seek to facilitate the protection of core 
community interests, to preserve such protection during times of rupture and to 
deny offensive treaties legal validity. All these are 'strains in the system' (Simma 
1983: 485), albeit with perhaps rather less impact than one might have expected. 
The international law of the 'international community' is made in fairly traditional 
ways.  
 (c) The 'international community' in the UN’s 'peace machinery' 
A look at multilateral treaties yields a rather different picture. Treaties may for 
the most part remain state-made, but they increasingly give expression to interests 
that transcend inter-state relations. In major standard-setting treaties backed up 
by institutional structures, the 'workhouse of community interest', in Simma’s 
(1993: 322) phrase, visions of the 'international community' have found their most  
obvious expression: through them, it gains concrete meaning; the law and practice 
of international institutions see the 'international community' in action. In legal 
terms, claims for action that is worthy of a true 'international community' typically 
appear as calls for agreement on ambitious treaty regimes with limited carve-outs, 
for broad powers of institutions set up by treaties (which must enable effective 
action on behalf of the 'international community'), or for the consistent use of 
powers vested in them. For present purposes, these debates are best read as 
attempts to inscribe lofty community visions into international law.  
In the case of the UN Charter, and the Charter’s peace and security design more 
particularly, these debates are particularly acute. The UN Charter is at the vanishing 
point of most 'international community' schemes – and the 'peace machinery'62 set 
up by it at the vanishing point of the Charter (cf. Lauterpacht 1952: 382). 
Unsurprisingly, it is seen as a test case for the 'international community', and since 
an analysis of the Charter’s regime reveals significant progress and remaining 
challenges and points to tensions between different variants of 'international 
community' schemes, it is an instructive test case.  
The starting point, to be sure, is relatively straightforward. The Charter views 
inter-state conflict as a major community concern; it addresses it by restricting the 
unilateral use of force by states and by empowering a Charter organ, the Security 
                                                          
 61 As Giorgio Gaja anticipated in 1981; hence the title of his Hague lectures: Gaja (1981: 271). 
 62 The term is Jessup’s: see Jessup (1960: 18).  
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Council, to respond to breaches of peace and threats to it.63 This seems fully in line 
with institutionalist and liberal understandings of an 'international community': a 
significant prerogative – the right to use military force – is centralised (or 
'institutionalised') in the hope of establishing a more peaceful international order; 
henceforth it is meant to be exercised by a trustee on behalf of the Charter’s 
'international community'. The Charter implemented these community postulates 
with a significant dose of pragmatism, however. In the (often misplaced) hope of 
facilitating effective action, it set up the trustee – the Security Council – as a 
relatively small body with relatively stable membership, gave it significant 
discretion in fashioning responses, and recognised the veto power as a price worth 
paying to bring significant trustees on board.64 What is more, while the UN counts a 
plenary body and an international court among its principal organs,65 it has 
relegated them to the margins of its 'peace machinery' (Jassup 1960: 18). 
 
In the UN practice of the last seven decades, the Charter regime has undergone 
significant modification. Elements of this practice can be rationalised as an attempt 
to bring the Charter law into line with the demands of a true 'international 
community'; other debates reflect a 'conflict between community institutions and 
community values'.66 Three aspects can be distinguished.  
First, the Charter regime has been flexibly adjusted to facilitate some form of 
institutionalised response even where the Charter scheme could not be 
implemented as planned. As the vision of effective, centralised Security Council 
action never really reflected reality, adjustment has notably involved the 
development of forms of 'substitute performance', which would enable the UN to 
respond somehow. Proposals to upgrade the role of the General Assembly (to 
replace a paralysed Council) under the Uniting for Peace procedure of GA Res. 377 
(V) are an early, and the most prominent, example.67 Perhaps they were too radical 
to meet with general approval, but they have never been formally discarded. Later 
                                                          
 63 See Article 2(4) and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Thomas Franck notes 
perceptively: 'On its face, the UN Charter, ratified by virtually every nation, is quite clear-eyed 
about its intent: to initiate a new global era in which war is forbidden as an instrument of 
state policy, but collective security becomes the norm …  This new way of ensuring peace and 
security was to be the prescribed cure for the disorders so evident in the first half of the 
twentieth century: passivity in the face of aggression – Manchuria, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia – 
and the egregious pursuit through violence of narrowly perceived national interests. The 
Charter text embodies these two radical new concepts: it absolutely prohibits war and 
prescribes collective action against those who initiate it': see Franck (2002: 2).  
 64 See Articles 23, 24, 27 and 39 of the UN Charter. 
 65 Namely the UN General Assembly and the International Court of Justice: see Article 7 of the 
UN Charter.  
 66 Paulus (2001: 325), 'Konflikt zwischen Gemeinschaftswerten und –institutionen'.  
 67 See UN General Assembly 377(V), in whose first operative paragraph, the General Assembly 
'[r]esolve[d] that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with 
a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, 
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force 
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.' 
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decades saw less intrusive forms of adjustment, notably the move towards a 
practice of military enforcement authorised (but not otherwise controlled) by the 
Security Council, viewed by most commentators as a useful 'outsourcing' of 
enforcement power.68 The increasing reliance on regional organisations as 
enforcement agents (at times with merely ex post facto authorisation69) has posed 
more significant problems, but it too reflects the UN’s willingness to apply the 
Charter system pragmatically.70 For the most part, proponents of 'international 
community' projects have viewed these attempts favourably, as they have 
increased the likelihood of effective UN action in defence of community interests71.  
Second, the mandate of the UN’s 'peace machinery' (Jessup 1960: 18) has been 
significantly expanded, and today encompasses aspects which, in 1945, would have 
been considered well within the domaine reservé of states. As is well-known, once 
rescued from paralysis, the UN Security Council during the 1990s began to tackle a 
diversity of 'threats to the peace', ranging from inter-state conflict to humanitarian 
crises within states.72 A broad reading of its Chapter VII powers notably enabled 
the Council to transform itself into a defender of fundamental human rights. This 
extension of the Charter’s peace and security regime was enthusiastically 
welcomed by adherents of 'international community' projects – in fact, it is the 
single most significant factor explaining the rise to prominence of these projects in 
the decade after the end of the Cold War. It saw an alignment of liberal-
cosmopolitan and institutionalist hopes, as a UN organ was taking a leading role in 
defence of liberal values. Paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
reflects such an alignment:  
'The international community, through the United Nations, also 
has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.'73 
Third, in other areas, this alignment has been put to the test. The Security 
Council’s more recent practice of targeted sanctions against individuals is a case in 
point: the 'listing' of terror suspects, coupled with mandatory restrictions on rights 
and limited options for scrutiny, has reignited concerns about the Council’s 
                                                          
 68 Ziccardi Capaldo (2008: vi) speaks of a 'public-private approach to law enforcement'. See also 
Franck (2002: 24), et seq. 
 69 See SC Res. 788, SC Res. 1132, accepting the intervention of ECOMOG, and Walter (1996: 289–
309). 
 70 For excellent accounts see Walter (1996); as well as Kamto (2007: 771).  
 71 See e.g. Franck (2002: 1), emphasising the '[t]he United Nations’ capacity for adapting to 
radical changes of circumstance'; Delbrück (1999: 139); and Payandeh (2010: 375), et seq. 
 72 In the words of Franck (2002: 43), '[t]he gradual attrition, in UN practice, of states’ monopoly 
over matters of "domestic jurisdiction" has occurred in tandem with an expansion of activities 
and conditions seen to constitute "threats to the peace"'. In his analysis of Article 39 of the 
UN Charter Commentary, Nico Krisch offers a panorama of 'issues' that the Security Council 
has viewed as triggering Chapter VII of the UN Charter: see Krisch (2012b) paras. 12–44.    
 73 GA Res. 60/1 (2005).  
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compliance with human rights.74 For adherents of 'international community' 
projects, this practice poses a dilemma: effective institutional action against 
terrorism needs to be balanced against the demands of human rights compliance. 
Liberal-cosmopolitan scholars have tended to emphasise the limits of Security 
Council powers, and placed hope in forms of decentralised control by domestic and 
regional courts.75 Cases like Kadi pit individual freedoms against effective 
institutional action – a situation that many international lawyers, otherwise used to 
being told that 'their' discipline lacked teeth, perceived as a novel challenge.76  
The second pen portrait outlines the UN Charter's attempt to implement a 
particular vision of the organised 'international community'. It highlights that, 
within organised treaty regimes, much depends on the proper construction of 
competence norms. In this respect, the Charter has, from the beginning, placed 
considerable trust in the Security Council. Having broadly construed its powers 
under Chapter VII, the Council today is able to act against a very broad range of 
threats to the peace. Put differently, the law of the Charter has been adapted and 
can now be used in defence of core values of the 'international community'. By 
contrast, the Security Council's decision-making process has not been adapted; as a 
consequence, the veto power remains a significant obstacle that regularly prevents 
effective institutional action. 
(d) The 'international community' and the law of state responsibility 
In debates about state responsibility - the third and last pen portrait offered here 
- the 'international community' appears yet again in a different light.77 Compared to 
the UN Charter's collective security regime, the topic of state responsibility may 
seem technical and dry. As understood by the UN International Law Commission, its 
main architect, it comprises 'the general conditions under international law for the 
state to be considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal 
consequences which flow therefrom'.78 Pursuant to the ILC's influential 
restatement,79 the law of state responsibility is general in scope (i.e. it potentially 
applies across the board), but also residual (so that it yields to specialised 
regimes).80 That residual framework forms part of customary international law, and 
operates as a horizontal, decentralised system between states. As a consequence, 
                                                          
 74 For a detailed discussion see Tzanakopoulos (2011). 
 75 See e.g. de Wet (2004); and the clear analyses offered by Tzanakopoulos (2012: 42); Krisch 
(2012a), paras. 38–52.  
 76 See e.g. Kokott; Sobotta (2012: 1015).  
 77 For a fuller treatment of the issues canvassed in the following see Paulus (2001), 386 et seq.; 
Villalpando (2005). 
 78 See para. 1 of the ILC’s Introductory Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, vol. II/2, 31 ('Articles'). 
 79 This restatement culminated in the adoption, in 2001, of a set of 59 Articles, which the UN 
General Assembly commended in GA Res. 56/83 and which are in large measure said to reflect 
customary international law. The text of the Articles is annexed to GA Res. 56/83 and 
reproduced, with detailed explanatory commentaries, in volume II/1 of the 2001 Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 2001. 
 80 For the latter aspect see Article 55 of the ILC’s Articles enshrining the lex specialis concept). 
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the law of state responsibility, unlike much of contemporary international law, is 
non-institutionalised. 
While remaining non-institutionalised, the law of state responsibility has 
undergone a significant transformation. Of the various areas of general 
international law, it has perhaps been most receptive to 'community-type' 
arguments. In subtle and significant ways, the traditional law, mainly developed in 
processes of bilateral (typically inter-state) claims, has been opened up to 
accommodate the needs of a legal order that protects community interests and 
enshrines rights of individuals and other non-state actors. The main conceptual 
shifts have been discussed in depth elsewhere,81 and thus can be presented here in 
summary form. Three aspects stand out:  
First, the ILC's work has freed the general law of responsibility from traditional 
concepts of damage and fault. In the (somewhat confusing) terminology, 
responsibility has become 'objective': a breach of the law is sufficient to trigger it, 
irrespective of whether that breach was based on culpable conduct, and 
irrespective of whether it caused tangible, measurable harm to another actor.82 
Liberated from some of its traditional baggage, the law of responsibility has 
become 'fit for purpose', i.e. fit to govern obligations outside reciprocal relations, 
notably those protecting collective interests or rights of non-state actors (Pellet 
2001: 290–1). 
Second, the 2001 Articles make significant room for the enforcement of collective 
interests.83 As a horizontal regime, they do not formulate enforcement powers of 
international institutions. However, the Articles recognise significant rights of other 
states to defend collective interests and interests of non-state actors. This they 
notably do by conferring upon individual states a right to respond to breaches of 
obligations that protect community interests. Under Article 48 of the ILC's text, any 
individual state is entitled to invoke another state's responsibility towards the 
'international community' as a whole. Drawing on the jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice, which decades earlier had recognised that all states 
have a legal interest in the protection of certain fundamental obligations (which 
the Court termed 'obligations erga omnes'), the provision operationalises a liberal-
cosmopolitan vision of a community in which shared values can be enforced not 
just via international institutions, but also decentrally, by individual guardians of 
community interests.84 Whether such decentralised enforcement could also include 
non-forcible measures of coercion (such as trade boycotts or travel bans) remained 
contentious until the very end of the ILC's work. Perhaps understandably, given the 
risk of abuse and the general scope of the law of state responsibility, states and the 
ILC were unwilling to recognise the lawfulness of 'third party countermeasures' 
expressly. However, they were not ruled out either: hence Article 54 of the ILC's 
                                                          
 81 See notably Simma (1989: 821); Pellet (2001: 285). 
 82 Article 2 of the ILC’s Articles. 
 83 The following draws on Tams (2005), notably chapters 5 and 6; as well as Tams (2011: 379).  
 84 Tams (2011: 383), et seq.; Crawford (2011: 221).  
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text contemplates the possibility of 'lawful measures against that state to ensure 
cessation … and reparation'.85 
Third, rather more cautiously, the Articles seek to mobilise states to defend core 
values of the 'international community'. They do so by identifying a regime of 
aggravated responsibility, which draws on the idea of a solidarist 'international 
community' that stands united against outsiders.86 This regime applies to serious 
infractions of peremptory norms, among them acts of aggression, of genocide or 
systematic abuses of fundamental human rights.87 Faced with such egregious 
violations, Article 41 imposes upon all members of the 'international community' a 
duty of non-recognition, and enjoins them to 'cooperate to bring to an end through 
lawful means any serious breach' of a peremptory norm. As has often been 
observed, this is a fairly modest regime of aggravated responsibility88: one that 
lacks real teeth, and pales in comparison to the ILC's initial (more ambitious and 
more controversial) plan to formulate a comprehensive regime applicable to 
egregious breaches designated as 'crimes of states'.89 But the move from the 
ambitious and controversial to the modest and acceptable version of aggravated 
responsibility helped ensure the relatively smooth acceptance of the ILC’s text by 
states. 
All things considered, though, the third pen portrait suggests that the 
'international community' has left a relatively heavy footprint on the law of state 
responsibility. The contemporary regime, as set out in the 2001 Articles, is non-
institutionalised. However, in line with liberal-cosmopolitan visions, it facilitates the 
decentralised enforcement of community interests by third states. 
 
5 Concluding Reflections 
The three sample tests reflect the role of international law as a site of 
contestation about different visions of international order, but of course they 
represent no more than the tip of the iceberg.  Just as in debates about law-
making, collective security and state responsibility, the 'international community' is 
making itself felt elsewhere – in discussions about climate change (which 'must 
unite the international community again', as the UN General Assembly was told 
shortly before the opening of the Paris COP21 summit90), about peace in the 
                                                          
 85 See Article 54 of the ILC’s Articles. For a more ‘robust’ approach, endorsing an express right, 
see Tams (2011: 389) et seq.; Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes (2005), ch. 6. 
 86 See Articles 40, 41 of the ILC’s Articles. For a clear analysis see Talmon (2006: 99); Christakis 
(2006: 127).  
 87 See Article 40 of the ILC’s Articles, whose second paragraph defines a serious breach as one 
that 'involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation'. 
 88 Talmon (2006: 125) notes perceptively that '[t]here is more authority for the obligation as 
such … than for its particular content'.  
 89 See Article 19 of the ILC’s first reading Articles (1996); and cf. Paulus (2001: 386),et seq. 
 90 See statements reproduced in UN General Assembly (2015), taking up a statement by 
Freundel Stuart, Prime Minister of Barbados.  
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Middle East, and about responses to the global financial crisis. In these instances, 
and in many more, the 'international community' has become an accepted point of 
reference; it is ubiquitous. In other words, the concept has been widely accepted 
despite disagreement on what it means. 
In the process, it has lost many of its contours, and much of its force. Quite how a 
proper law of the 'international community' should look is by no means certain – 
because the content of the concept itself is so diffuse: the 'international 
community' is (and in debates about international law appears as) a 'vehicle of 
convenience'91 that is waiting to be filled with meaning. And of course, once filled 
with meaning, the concept needs to be woven into the fabric of international law. 
This process has certainly begun, but it is cumbersome, and has yielded mixed 
results so far. The three pen portraits offered in the preceding section suggest that 
in that cumbersome process, references to the 'international community' offer an 
impulse towards reform, or a particular understanding of international law – but 
they do not control. All this means that the 'international community' concept can 
never quite deliver what it promises – but that attempts to discredit it as a 
dangerous notion inviting abuse are equally futile. The 'international community' 
has become part of the canon of international law: it helps structure debates, and it 
is a vague and flexible benchmark against which international law is assessed. 
 
  
                                                          
 91 Contrast Annan (1999), 'sceptics are wrong' when viewing the concept as 'a mere vehicle of 
convenience'.  
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The International Community and the 
Autonomy of International Law: Response to 
Christian Tams 
 
A Commentary by Theresa Reinold 
Introduction 
I found much to agree with in Tams’ piece - his contribution is as well reasoned as 
his claims are uncontroversial. So rather than offering a rebuttal to Tams, this 
comment will reflect further on the role of the international community in 
international law-making, especially as regards its contribution to ensuring the 
autonomy of the law from the political sphere. Generally, Tams is somewhat 
oblivious to the relationship between politics and international law, more 
specifically to the possibility of powerful states invoking the alleged values of the 
international community to universalise their particularistic norms, and thereby 
cement existing structures of inequality. The misuse of international law as an 
instrument of domination is one of the core themes of critical legal scholarship 
(CLS) – a school of thought which Tams mentions only in passing. Yet even if one 
accepts CLS’s argument about law being a product of political power, this does not 
mean that powerful states can make and remake international law as they see fit. 
International law does enjoy a certain autonomy from the political sphere - but 
what is the foundation of this autonomy? Theorizing the autonomy of international 
law might seem like an unfitting task for a political scientist, but neither 
international lawyers nor international relations scholars are condemned to the 
kind of reductionist arguments legal utopians and structural IR realists have 
succumbed to in their respective disciplines. The question of the law’s autonomy is 
especially acute in the international realm due to the openness of international 
law’s secondary rules of recognition and change: In the area of custom formation, 
for instance, political, even plainly illegal acts may have a direct impact on the 
substance of the law. Thus, the autopoietic notion of normative closure, which 
accounts for the autonomy of the law in the domestic sphere (Lempert 1988: 158; 
Teubner 1988: 2), does not apply to the international realm. The autonomy of 
international law must therefore rest on a different basis – which is where the 
concept of the international community comes in: In order to create the 
intersubjective quality necessary to turn subjective legal claims into positive 
international law, powerful actors must not merely pay lip service to, but actively 
construct normative fit between, their legal claims and the values of the 
international community at large. This requirement is what renders international 
law at least partially autonomous from political interference.  
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International law as an instrument of domination? 
This comment focuses on one dimension of international law-making, namely the 
process of custom (trans)formation, but will touch upon treaty law as well. Tams 
discusses custom formation in section 4, where he assesses – based on three case 
studies – to what extent contemporary international law reflects international 
community interests. However, Tams’ analysis is mainly empirical, not theoretical, 
in nature, and the nexus between secondary rules and the autonomy of 
international law is not addressed. Reflecting upon the role of the international 
community in the legal process, Tams emphasises a number of points, which 
according to him, seem relatively obvious, but are 'surprisingly often not made', 
including the claim that international law is a site of contestation, involving actors 
from the global core as well as the global periphery, whose visions of international 
law often collide. However, these aspects of international law have actually been 
the subject of a voluminous literature – witness, for instance, the TWAIL (Third 
World Approaches to International Law) movement.1 Yet Tams’ reasoning sidelines 
the issue of power politics in international law-making, neglecting the fact that 
what is seen as universal, as the collective interest of the 'international 
community', is often the particular, crystallizing into positive law because other 
actors accept the particularistic hegemonic norm as a universal one – the subjective 
thus becomes intersubjective. According to TWAIL scholars, reference to the 
interests of the international community should be treated with a healthy dose of 
skepticism, because this reference is often exploited by powerful actors who, in the 
name of supposedly universal interests, bend and break the law as they see fit. 
'[U]niversality,' Mutua writes, 'is always constructed by an interest for a specific 
purpose, with a definite intent … The question, therefore, is how local truths are 
legitimately transformed into universal creeds, what value judgements are made, 
who makes those judgements, how they are made, and for what purpose' (Mutua 
2000: 21). Invoking the 'international community' in legal discourse, according to 
critical legal scholars, is thus merely a figleaf to legitimise the pursuit of the narrow 
national interests of powerful states. 
While I have some sympathy for this argument, I believe the matter is actually 
more complex than that. To be sure, reference to the alleged values of the 
international community is often merely cheap talk, yet the concept of the 
international community is a knife that cuts both ways: its invocation can 
contribute to legitimizing and thereby reifying a Western-centric global order, yet 
it must be emphasised that international law cannot be made and remade by 
unilateral fiat – not even by the most powerful actors in the system. Thus, if 
powerful actors seek to universalise their own norms, they must make an effort to 
construct coherence – 'normative fit' – between their own values and those held by 
the international community at large. Blatantly self-serving attempts at changing 
international law will fail if the powerful actors do not succeed in obtaining 
intersubjective consensus that the intended change is in the interest of the 
                                                          
 1 Recent TWAIL scholarship includes Anghie (2006); Anghie und Chimni (2003); Baxi (2006); 
Buchanan (2008); Gathi (1998/1999); Gathi (2000); Mickelson (1997/1998); Mutua (2000); 
Okafor (2005); Otto (1996); Rajagopal (1998/1999); Rajagopal (2000); Rajagopal (2006). 
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international community as a whole. The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides an 
instructive example in this regard: The strongly negative reaction of the 
international community to the US intervention reaffirmed, rather than weakened, 
existing rules on self-defense, and prevented the emergence of a new expansive 
right to preventive war as posited by the United States.  
Legal autopoiesis and the concept of normative 
closure 
According to the theory of legal autopoiesis, legal systems may be irritated from 
the outside and are thus 'cognitively open', yet they remain 'normatively closed' 
and therefore evolve only in accordance with their internal logic (see, e.g., 
Luhmann 1988a: 20; Teubner 1988: 2). Legal autonomy according to autopoietic 
theory therefore does not mean that the law is impervious to political influences; it 
only means that the law itself sets the parameters for legal change. The legal 
system thus produces its elements according to its own logic, i.e. its layer of 
secondary rules, such as rules of recognition, which define the sources of law and 
thereby separate law from non-law. This self-referentiality is seen as the very basis 
of the law’s autonomy. If moral or political communications were allowed to 
directly trigger changes in the legal system, the autonomy of the legal system 
would be imperiled (Luhmann 1988b: 347).  
 
However, in the progressive development of international law, the distinction 
between legal and illegal, lex lata and de lege ferenda, is often difficult to uphold. 
Because of the openness of international law’s secondary rules, the international 
legal system cannot be regarded as normatively closed. International law is not a 
static system but a dynamic social process in which inconsistencies within the legal 
system, but also contradictions between legal and important non-legal norms held 
by the international community provide an impetus for legal change. Thus, if one 
accepts that influences from the political system may have a direct effect on the 
reproduction and possibly transformation of elements of the legal system, the 
autonomy of international law must be conceptualised differently than that of 
domestic law, and here the concept of the international community plays a crucial 
role.  
The openness of international law’s secondary rules: 
ex iniuria ius oritur 
As outlined above, Luhmann and associates assume that the legal system's 
secondary rules prevent political variables from having a direct effect on the 
content of the law. I am not sure this is true for domestic legal systems (think about 
judicial discretion in the progressive development of the law in common law 
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systems – the doctrine of stare decisis notwithstanding); but it is certainly not true 
for international law, where secondary rules do allow for a direct translation of 
political preferences into legal substance. While theorists of legal autopoiesis 
accept that the initial impetus for legal change usually comes from the political 
sphere, the process of translating political preferences into legal substance is 
governed by the secondary rules of the legal system. The principle ex iniuria ius non 
oritur is commonly believed to shield the law from political manipulation. However, 
in both treaty and customary international law, non-compliant behavior is actually 
an important source of legal innovation: in customary international law, breaches 
of the law initiate a process of claims and counter-claims in the course of which 
states' opinio juris, and thus the customary norm in question, potentially undergo 
modification. In the area of treaty law, the possible modification of treaties 
through subsequent practice – state behavior which is technically ultra vires – has a 
basis in state practice and has also been acknowledged by a number of legal 
experts (see, e.g., Bianchi 2009; Pauwellyn 2003; Schwarzenberger 1967).  
With regard to customary international law, in an often-quoted statement, 
Anthony D'Amato maintains that 'an illegal act by a state contains the seed of a 
new legality. When a state violates an existing rule … the illegal act itself becomes 
a disconfirmatory instance of the underlying rule ... eventually a new line of 
conduct will replace the original rule by a new rule' (D'Amato 1971: 97). However, 
the 'seed' sown by a law-violating state will not always lead to the 'blossoming' of a 
new rule. If this were indeed the case, international law would cease to perform its 
stabilizing function, that is, to guarantee a modicum of predictability in an 
otherwise very unpredictable world. Thus, while it is true that the law needs to be 
responsive to state interests in order not to slip into insignificance, it is also true 
that legal norms that are infinitely pliable cease to perform their legitimizing 
function, and that the requirement to construct normative coherence with the 
values of the international community precludes self-serving changes of the law by 
powerful states. Ex iniuria ius oritur thus only applies to cases in which the 
international community at large accepts a particular breach of the law as a source 
of normative innovation.  
In the field of treaty law, there are quite a few precedents of treaties having been 
modified through subsequent practice, yet within the scholarly community the 
transformative effects of subsequent practice are contested. Georg 
Schwarzenberger (1967: 168) writes that de facto amendment of a treaty may 
occur as 'the result of a gradual and inarticulate process of departure from 
consensual engagements without overt objection from other contracting parties'. 
Joost Pauwellyn (2003: 50) and Andrea Bianchi (2009: 659) also acknowledge the 
possibility of treaty modification through subsequent practice. The ILC has also 
taken up the issue. Quoting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which, in its 
decision on the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights maintained that 
'subsequent practice of the parties, within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention, can result in a departure from the original intent on the basis 
of a tacit agreement,' the ILC cautions, however, that it remains unclear whether 
the ICJ thereby effectively recognised that subsequent practice may have treaty-
modifying effects, or whether the Court was merely referring to the 
reinterpretation of treaties (International Law Commission 2014: 50).  
Reinold  |  Commentary 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 21 35 
 
 
Consequences for the autonomy and the rule of law 
Just as with the progressive development of customary international law, the 
possibility of modifying treaty provisions through subsequent practice raises 
thorny issues for the foundations of the international legal order, because 
acknowledging the law-generating effects of non-compliance challenges the 
presumption that the law ought to be complied with. On the other hand, as the ILC 
itself admitted, as 'important treaties reach a certain age ... the context in which 
they operate becomes different from the one in which they were conceived. As a 
result, it becomes more likely that some of these treaties' provisions will be subject 
to efforts of re-interpretation, and possibly of informal modification' (International 
Law Commission 2008: 370) in order to ensure that the values enshrined in these 
treaties reflect the changing values and political preferences of the international 
community as a whole. Compared to domestic legal systems, international law's 
mechanisms for adapting its rules to changing political circumstances are 
somewhat underdeveloped, and while compliance should be the norm, occasional 
departures from this norm are sometimes necessary to 'modernise' the law, i.e. 
ensure its continued relevance in a changing geopolitical context. As in common 
law processes, where the stability of precedent is occasionally sacrificed for the 
attainment of important political objectives, in the process of international law-
making fidelity to past legal practices will at times have to give way to new political 
realities. In both customary and treaty law the maxim ex iniuria ius non oritur is 
thus not tenable as a categorical principle of law (trans)formation.  
Having established that international law defies the autopoietic notion of 
normative closure, does this mean that international law enjoys no autonomy from 
political power? Not necessarily. I submit that it only means that international law 
has different ways of securing its autonomy, namely through the requirement of 
constructing coherence, or normative fit, with the values held by the international 
community as a whole. This principle imposes constraints upon powerful agents 
seeking to change international law. Normative structures cannot be changed by 
unilateral fiat; instead, even the most powerful actors in the system must make 
sure that their actions are not perceived as being dissonant with intersubjectively 
agreed norms – legal and/or non-legal. If they fail to do so, their norm 
entrepreneurship will not be successful and international law will resist change. 
Thus, even though the secondary rules of the international legal system do not 
preclude the possibility that violations of the law may change its substance, these 
rules nonetheless require that attempts at legal innovation be consistent with the 
values of the international community. If a particular breach of the law is not met 
with nearly universal support or at least tacit acquiescence, this breach will not 
trigger changes in the international legal system. This bars powerful actors from 
unilaterally changing the substance of the law to legitimise their parochial 
interests, thereby ensuring the relative autonomy of the law. 
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Conclusion 
In this comment I argued that it would be wrong to equate the international legal 
system’s openness to political stimuli with a lack of autonomy – on the contrary, it 
is precisely because of international law’s ability to adapt itself to a changing 
environment that the law retains its (partial) autonomy, legitimacy, and ultimately 
its compliance pull. To be sure, autonomy and legitimacy are two different 
concepts, yet there is a close connection between them. Only a law that maintains 
a certain independence from political power will be regarded as legitimate, and – in 
the absence of an international enforcement mechanism – legitimacy will be critical 
to ensuring compliance. If legal structures are viewed as being merely an 
expression of the particularistic interests of powerful agents, all the while being at 
odds with the intersubjective understandings held by the international community, 
this will undermine the law’s legitimacy. Consequently, attempts by powerful 
agents to reshape legal structures which evoke dissonance with fundamental 
values of the international community will leave existing legal structures intact. 
Hence the requirement of constructing normative fit with the values held by the 
international community not only explains how and why international law changes 
– and, at times resists change – it also forms the basis of international law’s partial 
autonomy from power politics, and hence its legitimacy. Thus, I agree with Tams 
that international law 'needs to be filled with life, accepted, and considered 
legitimate'; if these conditions are met, the law can maintain its relative autonomy 
from the political sphere. 
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